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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Scott McAuley challenged the district court’s conclusion that
the officer who encountered him initially pursuant to his community caretaking function
could pursue a drug investigation after Mr. McAuley was medically cleared.
Mr. McAuley argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
even though the officer had probable cause to believe he was driving without privileges,
he did not write a ticket or arrest Mr. McAuley for that offense, but instead abandoned
his investigation of that offense, and questioned Mr. McAuley at length about drugs. In
its brief, the State first argues that because the officer had probable cause to arrest
Mr. McAuley for driving without privileges, “he did not need reasonable suspicion of a
different offense in order to continue to detain [Mr.] McAuley.” (Resp. Br., p.4.) The
State argues in the alternative that “the district court correctly concluded that Deputy
Kinnan had reasonable suspicion to believe [Mr.] McAuley had been driving under the
influence of narcotics[,] and could lawfully detain him to confirm or dispel that
suspicion.” (Resp. Br., p.4.)
The State is incorrect. A police officer can conduct a drug investigation that
prolongs a person’s detention only if he has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
person detained has committed, or is about to commit, a drug crime. Here, the officer
did not have such reasonable suspicion, but was instead acting on a hunch that there
were drugs in Mr. McAuley’s vehicle. The officer questioned Mr. McAuley at length
about drugs, with the obvious intent of finding a reason to search his vehicle. The
officer’s questioning prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and violated his rights under the
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Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. McAuley included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his
opening brief. (App. Br., pp.1-5.) He includes this section here only to provide the
additional facts necessary for the Court to consider the State’s arguments on appeal.
After Mr. McAuley signed a medical release refusing further treatment,1 Deputy
Garrett Kinnan aggressively questioned him with the intent of finding a reason to search
his vehicle:


He first asked, “Are you sure there’s nothing in the vehicle I need to be
aware of—drugs, drug paraphernalia, marijuana, pipe, anything like
that?” (Video at 20:59:55-21:00:03.)



He then asked, “What’s in the car that you can’t leave?” (Video at
21:01:30.)



He then asked, “Any large amounts of cash in the vehicle?” (Video at
21:02:17.)



He then asked, “And, again, there’s no meth in your car?” (Video at
21:04:01.)



He then asked, “Is there any cocaine in your car?” (Video at 21:04:20.)



He then asked, “Would you give me consent to search your vehicle?”
(Video at 21:07:09.)



He then asked, “Is there anything illegal in this car?”
21:08:13.)

(Video at

The video reflects that Mr. McAuley signed the medical release at 20:58:24-20:59:08.
In his opening brief, Mr. McAuley stated he signed the medical release at 20:52:24.
(App. Br., p.2.) This was a typographical error.

1
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Mr. McAuley consistently denied there was anything illegal in his vehicle and did not
consent to a search. Deputy Kinnan then changed tactics and told Mr. McAuley that if
he called a canine to run a sniff, and if the canine alerted, and if he searched the vehicle
and found something inside, “You will go to jail.” (Video at 21:08:24-38.) In response,
after approximately eleven minutes of questioning, Mr. McAuley told Deputy Kinnan he
had a “small amount of personal methamphetamine in his vehicle.” (Video at 21:09:2832.) Deputy Kinnan then searched Mr. McAuley’s vehicle, arrested Mr. McAuley for
possession of methamphetamine, and transported him to jail. (R., pp.9, 10.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McAuley’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
While Mr. McAuley was being evaluated by paramedics, Deputy Kinnan learned

Mr. McAuley’s driver’s license had been suspended for an insurance violation. (R., p.7.)
Mr. McAuley does not contest that under Idaho law, Deputy Kinnan could have arrested
him for this offense. However, Deputy Kinnan did not arrest him for this offense, but
instead abandoned any inquiry into this offense, and questioned him at length about
drugs. The district court concluded Deputy Kinnan’s conduct was lawful because he
had probable cause to believe Mr. McAuley was driving without privileges, and had
reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. McAuley had been driving under the influence.
Mr. McAuley does not contest that Deputy Kinnan had probable cause to believe he had
been driving without privileges. He contends, however, that as a matter of law, this did
not allow Deputy Kinnan to detain him for approximately eleven minutes to question him
about drugs.
Deputy Kinnan prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention to question him about drugs
because of Mr. McAuley’s nervous behavior, the way he was answering questions, and
the fact that he could not recall the exact date he was released from prison. These
factors did not establish reasonable suspicion of drug activity. When he abandoned the
driver’s license investigation and began a drug investigation without reasonable
suspicion of drug activity, Deputy Kinnan violated Mr. McAuley’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court thus erred in denying
Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress.
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B.

A Police Officer Can Conduct A Drug Investigation That Prolongs A Person’s
Detention Only If He Has Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That The Person
Detained Has Committed, Or Is About To Commit, A Drug Crime
The State appears to contend that where an officer has probable cause to arrest

a person for one offense (here, driving without privileges), the officer can prolong the
person’s detention and question him without limitation about other possible offenses
(here, drug crimes). The State is incorrect. The fact that an officer has probable cause
to arrest a person for one offense does not give the officer carte blanche to prolong a
person’s detention to question him about unrelated offenses. Deputy Kinnan prolonged
Mr. McAuley’s detention to question him about drugs, and to find a way to search his
vehicle.

The prolonged detention and drug investigation of Mr. McAuley was not

supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and was unlawful.
The State asserts that Deputy Kinnan “did not need any basis for detaining
[Mr.] McAuley in addition to the probable cause he had to detain and arrest
[Mr.] McAuley for driving without privileges . . . .” (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State relies on
State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609 (Ct. App. 2014), for the proposition that
“reasonable suspicion of a different crime is only necessary for continuing a detention
‘upon resolution of the initial justifications for the stop.’” (Resp. Br., p.8 (quoting PerezJungo, 156 Idaho at 615).)

According to the State, the initial justification for

Mr. McAuley’s detention never ended because Deputy Kinnan could have arrested him
at any time for driving without privileges. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) The fact that Deputy
Kinnan did not arrest Mr. McAuley has legal significance.
Deputy Kinnan did not arrest Mr. McAuley for driving with a suspended license
and was not in the process of doing so after Mr. McAuley was medically cleared.
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Instead, he abandoned the driver’s license investigation in an effort to find a way to
search Mr. McAuley’s vehicle for drugs. What the Court should consider is not whether
the initial justification for the detention of Mr. McAuley ever ended, but whether it
reasonably should have ended. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)
(“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver
can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
that mission.”). It is clear that Deputy Kinnan prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention to
pursue an unrelated drug investigation.
Under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2209), Deputy Kinnan could not have
searched Mr. McAuley’s vehicle if he had arrested him for driving without privileges.
The United States Supreme Court held in Gant:
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a
search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a
warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement
applies.
556 U.S. at 351; see also State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515 (2010) (concluding,
under Gant, an officer’s warrantless search of the defendant’s truck violated the Fourth
Amendment). Deputy Kinnan had a hunch that Mr. McAuley had drugs in his vehicle,
and wanted to find a way to search the vehicle. He asked Mr. McAuley six times
whether there was anything illegal in his vehicle and asked for consent to search his
vehicle, which Mr. McAuley denied.

(See Statement of Facts and Course of

Proceedings.) This questioning prolonged Mr. McAuley’s detention and was in no way
related to the offense of driving without privileges. It was, in a word, unlawful.
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“Where a person is detained, the scope of detention ‘must be carefully tailored to
its underlying justification.’” State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000)
(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).) The focus should be on the
intensity, as well as the duration, of the detention. See Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361. “It
is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a
reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the
conditions of an investigative seizure.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. The State did not and
cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that Mr. McAuley’s continued detention was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to investigation of the offense of driving without
privileges.
C.

Deputy Kinnan Did Not Have Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That
Mr. McAuley Had Committed, Or Was About To Commit, A Drug Crime
Mr. McAuley argued in his opening brief that Deputy Kinnan did not articulate

specific facts which, together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
justified his suspicion that criminal activity relating to drugs was occurring. See State v.
Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409-10 (2012) (stating test for reasonable, articulable
suspicion). (App. Br., pp.8-13.) In its brief, the State contends Mr. McAuley “ignores
half of the factors noted by the district court and testified to by Deputy Kinnan.”
(Resp. Br., p.11.) Mr. McAuley acknowledges that Deputy Kinnan testified about the
whole course of his encounter with Mr. McAuley;2 however, when asked to state the
Among other things, Deputy Kinnan testified he initially observed Mr. McAuley “tossing
his head back and forth” with his eyes shut “like he was having a bad dream.”
(Tr., p.10, Ls.12-16, p.11, Ls.13-16.) And he testified Mr. McAuley “appeared to be
asleep or was having what seemed like a medical issue since he wouldn’t wake up.”
(Tr., p.10, Ls.6-8.)

2
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specific facts which led him to suspect that Mr. McAuley may have been driving under
the influence of drugs, Deputy Kinnan spoke of Mr. McAuley’s nervous behavior, the
way he was answering questions, and the fact that he could not recall the exact date he
was released from prison. (App. Br., pp.10-12.) As Mr. McAuley argued in his opening
brief, these factors did not establish reasonable suspicion of drug activity.

(App.

Br., pp.12-13.)
Because Deputy Kinnan abandoned the driver’s license investigation, for which
he had probable cause, and did not have reasonable suspicion of drug activity, Deputy
Kinnan’s extension of Mr. McAuley’s detention was unlawful.

See, e.g., State v.

Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560 (Ct. App. 2005) (detention held to be unlawfully extended where
officers abandoned investigation into traffic offense to pursue a drug investigation that
was not supported by reasonable suspicion). The district court should have granted
Mr. McAuley’s motion to suppress and suppressed the evidence found in his vehicle
along with the statements he made to Deputy Kinnan.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those in his opening brief, Mr. McAuley
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2016.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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